Withering Cash: Is Sweden ahead of the curve or just special?International Journal of Central Banking Vol. 18 No. 4, October, 2022 (with Hanna Armelius & Carl Andreas Claussen)Published Paper Riksbank WP VoxEU.org Column (Sep. 2020)
Electoral Cycles in Macroeconomic ForecastsJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization 202, 307-340, 2022 (with Davide Cipullo) Published Paper Riksbank WP
Adjusting for Information Content when Comparing Forecast PerformanceJournal of Forecasting, 36, 784–794, 2017 (with Michael K. Andersson & Ted Aranki) Published Paper Riksbank WP Code
Kommentar på Johan Lönnroths artikel "Brev till den parlamentariska riksbankskommittén"Ekonomisk Debatt 5/2018 (with Jesper Lindé)Swedish
Do Swedish Forecasters Properly Account for Sweden’s International Dependence?Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2017:2 (with Jesper Lindé)English, Swedish
It’s a myth that the Riksbank’s forecasts have been governed by modelsSveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2017:1 (with Jesper Lindé)English, Swedish
En myt att Riksbankens prognoser styrts av modellerEkonomisk Debatt 8/2016 (with Jesper Lindé)Swedish
An assessment of the Riksbank’s international forecastsEconomic Commentaries, No. 14, 2015, Sveriges Riksbank (with Ted Aranki)English, Swedish
Interest and inflation rates through the lens of the theory of Irving FisherSveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2015:2 (with Magnus Jonsson)English, Swedish
Biased Forecasts to Affect Voting Decisions? The Brexit Case
This paper explores whether macroeconomic forecasters use their forecasts to influence voting outcomes. We develop a theoretical model in which voters have to choose between remaining in the status quo and leaving it for an alternative. Voters rely on a macroeconomic forecaster that has preferences over a referendum outcome to form beliefs about the future states of the economy. The model yields four main predictions. First, the forecaster will release biased estimates as the vote approaches. Second, the forecaster will release biased estimates after the vote to preserve the credibility of its estimates. Third, the bias in the forecasts subject to the alternative state will dominate the bias in the forecasts subject to the status quo. Fourth, an increase in the forecaster's stakes in the voting outcome will lead to more biased estimates. All theoretical predictions are shown to be empirically supported in the context of the Brexit referendum.
Inefficient Use of Competitors’ Forecasts?
Do forecasters use competitors’ forecasts efficiently? Empirical results using a large panel of forecasters suggest that forecasters underuse information from their competitors in their estimates for current and next year’s annual GDP growth and inflation. The results also show that forecasters pay more attention to their competitors when releasing short-term forecasts compared to medium-term forecasts. A baseline model with noisy and private information supports the underuse interpretation and predicts that it is optimal to pay considerable attention to competitors’ work. The theoretical framework also rules out overconfidence as the primary explanation of the observed behavior. When the model is extended to include a revision cost, it can only explain the observed inefficiency and horizon dependency if asymmetric horizon discounting between revisions and forecast errors is assumed.